Pascal\u27s Biblical Omission Argument Against Natural Theology by Groothuis, Douglas
PASCAL'S BIBLICAL OMISSION 
ARGUMENT AGAINST 
NATURAL THEOLOGY 
DOUGLAS GROOTHUIS 
In the hope of clarifying the nature and role of faith and reason in the justifica-
tion of the Christian worldview, philosophers and theologians have pondered the 
Scriptures in order to find a biblically faithful and philosophically applicable episte-
mology regarding the existence of God. Many have found encouragement for the 
project of natural theology. These thinkers reckon general revelation to be a rich, 
although not exhaustive, resource for theistic arguments. Others have rejected natur-
al theology by adopting either another rational program in defense of God's exis-
tence or by favoring a more fideistic orientation. 
One persistent argument against natural theology appeals to special revelation 
itself as prohibiting such apologetic enterprises, however well-meaning their propo-
nents may be. Although he was an innovative and cogent apologist in his own right 
(and not a fideistl,' Blaise Pascal argued in Pensees that a faithful reading of the Bible 
precludes the enterprise of natural theology. One of his several arguments against 
natural theology can be called the biblical omission argument.' Since Pascal 
advances this argument forcefully, and because variations of his approach are still 
advocated in various theological circles, it is appropriate to probe his argument in 
order to discern whether or not it renders the endeavor of natural theology inconsis-
tent with the very faith natural theologians labor to defend. 
THE BIBLICAL CASE AGAINST NA1URAL THEOLOGY 
Pascal is impressed by the fact that no biblical writer argues from nature to 
Creator. No inspired writer is a natural theologian. His observation should be quot-
ed in full: 
It is a remarkable fact that no canonical author has ever used nature to 
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prove God. They all try to make people believe in him. David, Solomon, etc., 
never said: 'There is no such thing as a vacuum, therefore God exists.' They 
must have been cleverer than the cleverest of their successors, all of whom have 
used proofs from nature. This is very noteworthy.' 
Because the Scriptures themselves lack proofs from nature, Pascal has no need for them. 
He inserts the sentence, "They [the biblical writers] all try to make people believe in him," 
to mean that certain kinds of persuasion are appropriate, but proofs from nature are not. 
Pascal appear-; to be assuming that if the Scriptures are religiously normative with respect 
to theological knowledge about God, humans, ethics, and salvation, they must also be 
epistemically nonnative when it comes to theistic arguments.4 Pascal's reasoning seems to 
follow in this way: 
1. The Bible is epistemically normative. It specifically and exhaustively tells us how 
to acquire knowledge of God. 
2. No biblical writer gives a theistic proof. 
3. No biblical writer recommends or permits the construction of a theistic proof as 
a way to acquire knowledge of God. 
4. Therefore no theistic proofs are biblically sanctioned as ways to acquire knowl-
edge of God. 
[n other words, if God had sanctioned theistic arguments from nature, he would 
have inspired a biblical writer to present one or more such arguments. We could 
extend Pascal's observation by adding that if theistic proofs were appropriate we 
would expect the Scripture at least to advocate the construction of one or more of 
them. But Scripture does neither, therefore, we can conclude that God does not sanc-
tion theistic arguments. 
Pascal's argument is valid. Its soundness is another matter because premises I and 3 
are questionable. We should remember that Pascal does not rest his per-;pective simply 
on a lack of overt natural theology in the Bible; he also believes that the stated scriptural 
teaching on sin, the fall, and redemption prohibits arguments based on natural theology, 
because of the inherent corruption of human reason through sin. It is fiP-il important to 
analyze Pascal's biblical omission argument on its own merits to discern what, if any-
thing, it entails with respect to natural theology. Does this omission show that natural 
theology is opposed to the very theism it purports to defend? 
Concerning premise I, no one should expect that one book-even a large book that 
Christians claim as a revelation-should contain everything of epistemic significance. The 
fact that the Bible lacks arguments on many disputable issues in the twentieth century is 
no evidence that such arguments are beside the point An omission need not be a prohi-
bition. But Pascal might want to argue that there is nothing of greater significance to 
Christian theism than God and our epistemic deportment toward him. The concept of 
belief in God is pivotal to the entire Bible and thus to Christian theology, spirituality, and 
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ethics. It would be legitimate, then, to expect the Bible to contain everything epistemically 
pertinent to acquiring belief in God. We should expect the Bible-when taken as a revela-
tion from God to all humanity-to exemplify or encourage natural theology if the practice 
is legitimate. But it does not This, Pascal could say, is no incidental omission but rather a 
disarming silence. Natural theologians are left without any biblically sanctioned tools. 
It could be argued that the biblical writers had no need of theistic arguments given the 
religious climate in which they wrote, and that this historical condition accounts for why 
there is no record of such arguments in Scripture. But this does not mean that theists in 
more skeptical intellectual environs might not have use for them.' Atheism does not seem 
to have been a particular problem for the biblical writers, although the same cannot be 
said for polytheism or pantheism. John Baillie observes that "none of the Old Testament 
writers treats the existence of deity as if it were an open question or in any sense prob-
lematic,'' and the same can be said of the New Testament.' Henry Sloane Coffin once 
preached that the Ten Commandments began with "Thou shall have no other gods 
beside me," instead of 'Thou shall have at least one God."7 
One might counter this claim by arguing that the Bible itself admits of atheists. In 
Psalm 14, verse 1, the writer says that "the fool says in his heart, There is no God,'" (see 
also Psalm I 0:4 and 53: I). If the Bible cites actual atheists and refuses to engage in natur-
al theology, this would strengthen the claim that the Bible does not sanction the practice. 
This argument should not be ignored, but the use of the word "atheist" by the psalmist 
does not likely refer to one who denies a divine being, but rather to one who defies a 
divine being. This view can be established without great exegetical effort A note in the 
New International Versiiln Study Bible on Psalm 14:1 rightly calls the "fool's" view a "practi-
cal atheism."' Another explanatory note in 1he New Oxford Annotated Bible commenting 
on a parallel verse in Psalm 10:4 says 'They are not atheists, but deny that God is con-
cerned with moral retribution."' In other words, the Psalms speak of those who try to 
deny God in their actions while still knowing that he exists. This is explained by another 
verse in Psalm I 0 that further describes the "atheist": "He says to himself, 'God has forgot-
ten; he covers his face and never sees' " (verse 11 ) . The "atheists" are trying to deny the 
moral consequences of God's existence in relation to their misdeeds. So for all intents and 
purposes, they live like atheists and are as such "practical atheists." John Baillie comments 
that these verses do not have to do with "intellectual perplexity but with sinful evasion-
with wicked man's attempt to persuade himself that he can go through with his wicked-
ness and yet escape divine judgment."'° 
This could be likened to the cigarette addict who knows that her addiction is extreme-
ly unhealthy yet continues to smoke with abandon. When confronted with facts that 
prove her potentially suicidal actions, she brushes them off and refuses to take them seri-
ously. She is thus both a nay-sayer about the perils of smoking (because she doesn't 
change her actions and refuses to admit the dangers) and a believer in these dangers 
nonetheless. This kind of psychological situation is not rare, and many other kinds of 
examples could be supplied. 
Given the epistemic significance of the ancient historical situation as religious, it seems 
illegitimate to view Scripture as definitively circumscribing the means of acquiring knowl-
edge of God. One can still hold that the Bible is theologically authoritative and morally 
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normative without holding that it is epistemically normative with respect to the specific 
strategic employment of theistic arguments in such a way that it therefore disallows the 
practice of any natural theology that it does not exemplify. So premise I is not clearly 
true and is likely false in the way stipulated above. 
The absence of either theistic proofs or any direct admonition to engage in such proofs 
need not preclude natural theology as salutary for some Christians. It is clear that the bibli-
cal writers offer no theistic proofs (Pascal's premise 2). But we must question Pascal's 
premise 3 that no biblical writer advocates or allows theistic proofs. Several biblical texts 
teach that God is manifested in the natural order. If "the heavens declare the glory of God" 
(Psalm 19: I), one might infer that natural arguments are available to convince skeptics of 
this fact On the other hand, it has been suggested that this text might be simply a confession 
of the believing psalmist and not an assertion that one could infer from the heavens that 
God made them. On this reading, the psalmist believes the heavens declare the glory of 
God; but the heavens give no independent evidence for the existence of God 
But verse four of Psalm I 9 might challenge this view: 'Their voice goes out into all the 
earth, their words to the ends of the world." This universal reference may indicate that the 
heavens offer a worldwide testimony to God (through their "voice") that should be recog-
nized by earth's inhabitants. This interpretation would mean that the evidence for God is 
everywhere available. Yet the critic could reply that their voice being heard simply means 
that all can observe the heavens, but all do not recognize the starry heavens in particular 
(and the universe in genera\) as God's work, nor can they because they lack the convic-
tion that God exists. Pascal seems to have held this view. In speaking of the claim that 
"the sky and the birds prove God," he replies that his religion does not say so "for though 
it is true [that the sky and birds prove Godl in a sense for some souls whom God has 
enlightened in this way, yet it is untrue for the majority.'"' 
This could be likened to me hearing a Russian speaker without having a translator 
available. I hear his voice, but I do not understand the message. 
Both interpretations have some merit, although the universal testimony view seems 
most consistent with the overall context of the Psalm. Nevertheless, these verses taken 
alone cannot serve either to license or to prohibit natural theology. 
[n response to the objection that "since a cause cannot be demonstrated by an effect 
not proportionate to it seems that the existence of God cannot be demonstrated; 
Thomas Aquinas says, "On the contrary. The Apostle says: The invisible things of Him are 
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made (Rom. I :20l." Thomas contin-
ues, 'This could not be unless the existence of God could be demonstrated through the 
things that are made. For the first thing we must know of anything is whether it exists."" 
Thomas thinks it is required that we be able to know through argument that God exists 
in order for Paul's statement to make sense. Thomas is not arguing that Paul provides 
such an argument (Paul only gives an assertion), but that if his statement is true (as 
Thomas claims it is), such a theistic argument is both needful and possible--since revela-
tion will never contradict reason. This challenges Pascal's premise 3 that proofs are not 
recommended in Scripture. Thomas thinks they are required if the Romans passage is to 
make sense. 
Thomas' inference rests on two notions. First, he assumes that if God can be known 
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"by the things that are made," such knowledge must be proved by rational argument in 
which "the things that are made" serve as a premise or evidence for the argument But 
some, such as Calvin and Alvin Plantinga, have argued that while one may know God 
through creation, one needs no argument to do so. God's existence can be known as an 
intuitive truth or a properly basic belief not inferred from anything else. Seeing a flower 
may occasion the belief that God made that flower, and serve as the "grounding" for that 
belief; but, according to Plantinga, the existence of natural objects does not provide evi-
dence for the deity." 
Second, Thomas interprets the passage to mean that "the invisible things of Him are 
clearly seen" by humanity as a whole; that is, the creation reveals the Creator to every 
sentient person. This interpretation has a long and substantial history and seems to fit 
Paul's overall argument of Romans chapters I through 3 to establish the guilt of the entire 
human race. But RT. Herbert has argued that Paul is speaking of pagan polytheisl5, not of 
humanity as a whole (which includes atheisl5). Therefore, God's existence is not rationally 
demonstrated to all humans through creation. Rather, if one is a polytheist, it would be 
rational to reduce one's theology to one God. But this doesn't imply that the text in 
Romans teaches that a rational argument from creation is available to persuade the atheist 
to become a theist. 14 
Paul's statemenl5 certainly indict polytheisl5 as idolaters who should know better. Yet 
Paul levels his charges against the ungodliness of all who suppress the truth in their 
wickedness, against an who fail properly to worship the one true Creator. This reference 
seems universal in scope (including humanity as a whole, whatever metaphysics one 
holds) and not limited to the particular ungodliness of polytheis15, especially given the fact 
that Paul bases his argumenl5 on the universally accessible fact of the material creation. 
Therefore, atheist5, polytheisl5, and any other nontheists are responsible for their compre-
hension of God, which is available through nature. 
We cannot definitively settle this interpretive question here, but it will suffice to say 
that in light of this controversy the biblical evidence is not clearly against natural theology. 
No texl5 directly prohibit natural theology; neither do any passages seem to unambigu-
ously demand natural theology; yet some seem to permit or even encourage it. 
One could argue that the task of Christian philosophers in more skeptical times could 
include constructing argumenl5 that alert unbelievers to the manifestations of God in 
nature so as to persuade them to believe in God. These argumenl5, if inspired by Romans 
chapter one, could be a posteriori argumenl5 of the cosmological or teleological type since 
they argue from an observance of nature (or natural premises) to the existence of God 
Or appeal could be made to an a priori ontological argument The natural theologian 
might cite the Apostle Peter in favor of natural theology for a skeptical time: "Always be 
prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope 
that you have" (I Peter 3: 15). If the atheist asks for a reason why the believer believes in 
God, he should be given one-and this shouldn't in principle preclude theistic proofs 
(although other kinds of reasons might be given). The natural theologian could grant that 
no theistic argumenl5 per se are given in Scripture but still challenge Pascal's notion that 
the Scriptures do not allow such theistic argumentation in any circumstance. 
Thomas Morris has put the matter well in speaking of philosophical theology in gener-
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al (which includes natural theology): 
From the fact that the biblical documents, written as they were to deal with 
burning practical questions of the greatest personal significance, do not address 
all the possible philosophical questions which can also, in their own way, be of 
the greatest intellectual significance, it does not follow at all that these more the-
oretical questions are illegitimate, or that they are unimportant. 1 
He goes on to suggest that any person asking philosophical questions about religious 
matters should do all in his power to find answers to these questions, even if they are not 
directly answered by the Bible itself. To do otherwise would be to deny an important 
aspect of one's identity." 
Morris is speaking broadly of philosophical theology that includes much more than 
theistic proofs, and it might be the case--although he does not make this claim--that only 
matters pertaining to the coherence of theism (its conceptual integrity), rather than the 
existence of God, are the proper subject of his remarks. That is, the believer or unbeliever 
can legitimately engage in philosophical theology by reflecting on divine intelligibility and 
compatibility of the divine attributes, but not tty to construct proofs for God's existence. 
But this limitation would apply only if some other reason can be given for rejecting the 
proofs besides the fact that the Bible omits them. Morris believes that an omission may 
not be a prohibition, especially if the raw materials-if not the finished arguments-for 
philosophical theology are available in Scripture itself. 
Another of Pascafs assertions could be challenged by those who allow, encourage, or 
practice natural theology. Pascal remarks that none of the biblical writers gives proofs--
which is true--but he also says "they must have been cleverer than the cleverest of their 
successors, all of whom used proofs from nature." By this he seems to mean that if the 
best and brightest canonical authors deemed theistic proofs unworthy or unnecessaiy, 
then we ought to imitate their philosophical omission. But even an orthodox view of the 
inspiration of Scripture need not affirm that the biblical writers were "the cleverest of the 
clever' -the most intelligent theologians of all time. All that need be affirmed is that each 
writer was infallibly inspired by God to write as he did for the purposes at hand." If Gocf s 
existence did not need argumentation in the cultural milieu of the biblical writers, this 
doesn't imply that someone clever enough to construct theistic arguments might not 
come along at a later time when skepticism should render them necessaiy. It could be 
that Thomas Aquinas, philosopher extraordinaire, was, in "more clever" than Solomon 
or David or any other biblical writer with respect to natural theology; but this would not 
imply that the biblical writers were not divinely inspired or that Aquinas was so inspired. 
All it would imply is that a Christian philosopher deigned to use reason in service of faith 
in a different way than that of the canonical writers. 
THEOLOGICAL AsSISTANCE FROM BA VINCK? 
An argument that fits the spirit of Pascaf s rejection of natural theology was also given 
by Herman Bavinck, a Dutch theologian favorably cited by Plantinga partially to substanti-
ate his claim that natural theology is not needed for an episternically credible Christian 
belief:" 
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I 
I 
Pascal's Argument Against Natural Theology 23 
A distinct natural theology, obtained apart from any revelation, merely through 
observation and study of the universe in which man lives, does not exist. ... 
Scripture urges us to behold heaven and earth, birds and ants, flowers and lilies, in 
order that we may see and recognize God in them. "Lift up your eyes on high, and 
see who hath created these" ls, 4026. Scripture does not reason in the abstract It 
does not mal<.e God the conclusion of a syllogism, leaving it to us whether we think 
the argument holds or not But it speaks with authority." 
Bavinck thinks that the reason Scripture lacks theistic proofs is that any syllogistic rea-
soning, however cogent, is incompatible with biblical authority. By this he seems to mean 
that if proof for God's existence were derivative of natural premises and inferential rea-
soning, then biblical authority would be compromised. God's existence, for Bavinck, is not 
established by arguments based on non-theological premises, but by biblical revelation 
alone. The Bible tells us to see God as Creator and nature as God's creation: it does not 
tell us to see nature as evidence for God. 
Bavinck' s argument is similar to Pascal's biblical omission argument in that it regards 
biblical revelation as epistemically authoritative, and rules out extra-biblical means of 
acquiring knowledge of God-that is, natural theology. In logical form, Bavinck's argument 
runs as follows: 
I. Whatever speaks with the highest authority allows no external corroboration 
(implied). 
2. The Bible speaks with the highest authority (about the existence of God). 
3. Therefore, the Bible allows no external corroboration (with respect to the exis-
tence of God). There is no efficacious natural theology. 
This argument is valid, but its first premise will be disputed. 
Bavinck attempts to give a reason why the Scriptures lack theistic proofs, although the 
Scriptures themselves give no reason. So he cannot speak with the direct authority of rev-
elation on this issue, although he believes his argument is based on the overall testimony 
of Scripture. We need to look more closely at the nature of authority to see if Bavinck's 
premise 1 is true. 
Whatever speaks with authority-at whatever level-must be viewed by others as hav-
ing authority, if it is to be recognized as authoritative. This almost tautological observation 
can be used against Bavinck. A text on biology may be the definitive statement on the 
subject and thus have the highest scientific authority. Yet this authority would not be 
damaged by those who refuse to view it as authoritative out of ignorance, perversity or 
disagreement Neither would it demean the authority of the text if someone were to 
defend its credentials to skeptics whom the defender wishes to convince. It could still 
have the highest authority as a biology text even though its authority needed to be cor-
roborated through various means. The means used to certify the authority are simply 
what constitutes its credentials as an authority. Credentials do not undermine authority; 
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they establish it. 
We could imagine God making use of natural theology-by creating brilliant natural 
theologians such as St. Thomas or Richard Swinburne for this purpose-to accredit himself 
as existing for certain skeptical types. Since God would be viewed as creating the very 
means by which natural theology accredits him, the use of natural theology need not 
diminish the authority of God's Word, the Bible; it would rather complement biblical 
authority. The intrinsic authority of Scripture would not be dependent on the arguments 
of natural theology, but God's existence would be demonstrated through such arguments 
for those people who aren't content to rely on the biblical evidence alone. The statements 
of the Bible would receive their epistemic credentials through natural theology and thus 
be shown as having the highest authority. 
Bavinck may be thinking that the authority of the Bible's pronouncements on God's 
existence are not simply true-that God exists, that he is the ultimate Judge and 
Redeemer, etc.-but that these pronouncements are self-attesting or self-authorizing and 
so in need of no outside corroboration. Self-attesting or self-authorizing here means not 
that the statements are tautologically true or must be seen as true by any attentive 
thinker-statements such as "the whole is greater than the parts" or "no object is bigger 
than it is." What is meant is that they appeal to no other human source for their credibili-
ty. A better way to put it might be to say that the Bible's pronouncements on the exis-
tence of God are "God-attested" because God alone certifies their truth value in the 
Scripture without any extemaL evidential support. 
In this sense, to speak with authority means to need no assistance or extrinsic autho-
rization, as when a father says to a three-year-old child, "No dessert tonight because you 
misbehaved today." That's the final word. To enlist a sociologist to concur would be 
absurd. 
One may choose to view Scripture's authority in this way, but it doesn't seem forced 
upon us, unless-as we have denied-specific texts forbid natural theology. Further, many 
orthodox natural theologians have not viewed the Bible in this manner. Even if one holds, 
as did Bavinck and PascaL that the Bible alone is the inspired Scripture, this need not 
imply that God is limited to this medium to convince skeptics of his existence. 
The idea that the Bible is the ultimate and final witness to or revelation of God's exis-
tence need not necessarily eliminate the idea that there are independent reasons that 
could convince skeptics that God exists. Thus Bavinck' s first premise seems false. If this is 
so, his criticism loses its force and his assist to Pascal is nullified. 
To pursue this debate on natural theology in any more depth would take us beyond 
the scope of our inquiry. We may, however, safely conclude that for Pascal (or Bavinckl 
to make the case that theistic arguments are inappropriate, he needs to look further than 
the biblical omission argument. It may well be that theistic arguments should be deemed 
illegitimate by believer.; for a variety of other reasons, and that believer.; should adopt a 
moderate theological non-naturalism. But the mere fact that theistic proofs are not overtly 
stated in Scripture is an inconclusive argument against their felicity. To rely on this fact 
alone would appear to commit the fullacy of the argument from silence. When Pascal 
says that the absence of natural theology in Scripture is "very noteworthy" he means, I 
think, that its absence bespeaks a host of other factors about the limitations of human rea-
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son, the noetic effects of sin, and the nature of God as infinite that render such proofs ille-
gitimate. A discussion of these factors, however, would take us beyond the biblical omis-
sion argument proper. 
AN INCONCLUSIVE ARGUMENT 
This paper has considered the biblical omission argument against natural theology and 
has argued that although it raises interesting issues deserving of further attention, it is 
insufficient to invalidate natural theology. The fact that no biblical author offers a speci-
men of natural theology does not necessarily imply its illegitimacy, although it does raise 
the question as to why there is an omission. This could be because no arguments were 
needed during the time the documents were written, although such arguments might be 
needed at a later point Therefore, whatever other arguments may be marshalled against 
natural theology, the absence of theistic arguments in the biblical text itself does not pro-
vide a sufficient argument to abandon its employment by extra-biblical apologists. 20 
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